Fertility Decline in Finland – Causes and Consequences : Research into reasons of long term fertility decline and discussion starting point to define future implications. by Hartomo, Sonja
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Helsinki Metropolia University of Applied Sciences 
International Degree Programme 
European Business Administration 
Bachelor’s Thesis  
Updated on 19 August 2014 
Sonja Hartomo 
 
Fertility Decline in Finland – Causes and 
Consequences 
 
Research into reasons of long term fertility decline and 
discussion starting point to define future implications.  
     Abstract 
 
Author 
Title 
 
Number of Pages 
Date 
Sonja Hartomo 
Fertility in Finland – Causes and 
Consequences 
44 pages + 1 Appendix 
Last updated 19 August 2014 
Degree Metropolia Business School 
Degree programme International Degree Programmes 
Specialisation option European Business Administration 
Instructor Michael Keaney 
Today the average age of the population in many countries is increasing due to low 
fertility rates. In order to maintain the current age structure, the fertility rate should 
be at a regeneration level of 2.1. An ageing population has an impact on a country’s 
economy in terms of increasing health care costs, higher taxation, a greater 
dependency ratio, a shortage of workers, and potentially changes the economic 
structure as higher demand for goods from the elderly coupled with their pension 
savings will influence capital investments. 
 
There are two main methods for analysing the causes of low fertility. The first is a 
structural approach, where female education and participation in the labour market 
have increased alongside policy changes in relation to employment and economic 
conditions. The second approach is focused on understanding cultural factors, taking 
into consideration changing values and attitudes towards increased female 
independency. In Finland the 2014 fertility rate is just 1.78 and has been steadily 
declining since the WWII baby boom years. Post-WWII fertility decline can be 
explained partially through structural changes; however, the biggest effects have 
come from cultural changes. In order to avoid further fertility decline, and greater 
population ageing, the labour market should be restructured with a focus on gender 
balance and greater financial subsidies from the government to families. The deficit in 
the labour force in the short term can be compensated with migration, although in the 
long term this is not a sustainable solution. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The world’s population is constantly increasing and is estimated to reach 9.5 billion by 
2050 (World Meters 2014). At the same time, many countries are facing up to the 
problems caused by a significantly ageing population. This change in the structure of 
society has major long-term consequences, particularly in terms of population decline 
and saturated economic growth (Amac et al. 2010). It also has an effect on 
dependency ratios, health care costs, and taxation levels, in addition to influencing the 
labour market. The country’s economic sectors can also face changes as demand for 
goods targeted at the elderly increase. Additionally, a significant increase in retirement 
savings negatively influences capital investments. 
 
The demographic of an ageing population can be defined in a variety of ways; one 
method is to focus on the increase of elderly individuals who are older than 60-65 
years. The process of ageing differs between individual and society. The ageing of an 
individual is an inevitable process that affects everyone; however, the ageing process 
of the population reflects the structure of the entire nation. Total fertility contributes to 
the age structure of the population. The age structure will remain stable if the fertility 
rate is at a regeneration level of 2.1; however, a rate below this will cause a population 
to age. If this fertility rate continues to decline the size of the labour force as the main 
tax contributors, will be reduced to a level lower than the section of the population that 
is dependent on them (Alho 2008; Treynor 2008). 
 
The definition of ageing has changed over time. In the 1800s a 60-year-old person was 
considered elderly and only 25% passed that benchmark. In the 21st century Western 
world 60-year-old is considered as middle aged and 80-year-olds receive considerable 
medical operations in order to continue their active life style. In conclusion, the life 
expectancy in 2000s is significantly higher than in the 1800s (Sanderson & Scherboy 
2008). Ageing population results in considerable number of retirees compared to the 
working population, therefore, creating financial pressure in terms of supporting the 
retirees with the tax funds collected from the working population. 
 
In countries where a significant fraction of the population is below 15 years, the age 
structure creates a financial burden in terms of supporting and educating the young, 
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therefore negatively affecting the gross domestic product (GDP), since only a minor 
fraction of the investment will add value to the national accounts (Amac et al. 2010). 
As the fertility declines, the working population eventually starts growing faster than 
the dependent fraction of the population, leading to economic growth (Bloom et al. 
2003). In addition, the working population may start saving for retirement, therefore 
increasing the capital resource of the nation. Theoretically lower fertility can lead to 
growth that can later compensate the cost of supporting the elderly. 
 
However, an ageing population is not economically sustainable since less and less 
people will contribute to the financial support given to the non-working population (Lee 
& Mason 2010). Replacement level fertility is crucial economically, however, in low-
fertility countries, increasing the fertility rate is challenging. There are various factors 
contributing to low fertility. 
1. There are fewer people in childbearing age; hence, fewer children are born. 
2. Changed social norms influence the desired number of children. 
3. Desired standard of living is determined by consumption standards of a 
household, resulting in possible constraint on the desired number of children, in 
order to maintain certain living standards. (Amac et al. 2010) 
 
Amongst other European countries, Finland is also facing the challenge of an ageing 
population. Since the post-WWII fertility peak the total fertility has declined steadily, 
currently being 1.76. From the below chart we can see that the population is ageing 
fast and that the population dependency ratio is increasing. Currently the ratio is 
approximately 55; however, by 2060 it will be nearly 80, hence creating a heavy 
financial burden on the working population (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Finland: The dependency ratio of the population 1865-2060. Tilastokeskus 2009b. 
 
This thesis investigates the causes and consequences of the low fertility rate in 
Finland. We will approach the issue in three sections; firstly setting a basis for 
discussion through existing literature on economic and non-economic theories and 
examples; secondly examining the current situation in Finland based on the discovered 
theories; thirdly discussing possible outcomes, scenarios and governmental policies 
having positive influence on fertility rates, hence, slowing the ageing of the population. 
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2 Importance of fertility rate 
 
”Tracking trends in fertility and birth rates is essential in planning for the current and 
future needs of multiple generations (Child Data Bank, 2013 p. 2)”. The Child Data 
Bank (2013) well defines the importance of a country’s fertility rate. It is highly 
important to have a clear knowledge of a country’s current fertility rate and of the 
possible increasing or decreasing future trends. Sustained high or low fertility rate can 
lead to unbalanced age structure within the population causing economic and 
infrastructural pressure for providing necessary services and financial support to the 
over presented age group. 
 
Feyrer et al. (2008) have two ways to define the fertility rate within a country: total 
fertility rate and completed fertility rate. In simple terms total fertility rate can be 
defined as how many children are born annually per woman of child-bearing age. The 
child-bearing age can be defined for example as 15-45 years. High enough fertility rate 
is important for the existence of a nation. Fertility rate of 2.1 per woman is needed in 
order for the population to replace itself in developed countries. Infant and child 
mortality is taken into consideration in the number. In developing countries the rate 
replacement rate is higher due to higher infant and child mortality. (Feyrer et al. 2008; 
Espenshade et al. 2003) 
 
The second concept is called completed fertility rate. It calculates the number of births 
per woman for women who have completed their child-bearing age (Feyrer et al. 2008, 
p. 8). Using this method, the birth rate is compared by the year when the mother has 
been born. For example, we can say that in a country X a birth rate of a woman born 
in 1920 is 2.8, however, women born in 1960 obtain birth rate of 2.1. In this thesis we 
will use the total fertility rate as discussion point. 
 
Many different factors influence the fertility rate of a country therefore creating a 
challenging environment to manage the implications of high or low birth rates 
economically and politically. This section will firstly discuss determination of fertility 
rate and secondly the relation of age structure and population growth to economic 
growth. Thirdly, we will discuss the cultural and non-economic factors affecting the 
total fertility rate of a country. 
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2.1 Determination of fertility rate 
 
In this chapter the research attempts to define different factors influencing fertility. We 
will discuss the different economic factors as well as the importance of culture and 
value. The research attempts to challenge some of the set norms that are seen as the 
main influencers of fertility.  
 
 
2.1.1 Fertility decline 
 
There are two primary models explaining the relationship between economic factors 
and fertility. Both models assume that there is a fundamental positive relationship 
between fertility and income and both of them challenge the explanations of negative 
relationship that which has been observed as relatively new theory. The driving force 
behind these two theories is fundamentally different from each other. The two models 
are called the “price of time” model and the “relative income”, or the Easterlin, model. 
(Macunovich 2007) 
 
Often the economic models treat family planning similar to purchasing consumer goods 
(Macunovich 2007). Due to the fact that human beings are not rational (Berreby 2012) 
many non-economists argue that children cannot be compared to goods; in 
unsatisfactory situation a consumer good can be traded, however, the same does not 
apply to children (Becker 1960 cited in Macunovich 1998; Becker & Lewis 1973 cited in 
Macunovich 1998). A purely economic approach does not take into consideration 
irrational human qualities such as love and affection between partners and towards 
children and family ties. Human irrationality limits purely economic theories and 
therefore these theories should be questioned (Ariely 2009). 
 
There are five (5) different factors associated with the decrease in fertility in 
developed, so called Western countries. These factors are considering especially 1900s 
and the 2000s (Feyrer et al. 2008). According to Galor (2005) increased demand for 
human capital increases the desire to produce high-human-capital children (“quality” 
over “quantity”), therefore leading to demographic change. 
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According to Becker (1981) positive income development increases the opportunity 
cost of women and men in relation to work, family and spare time. Female 
participation in labour force is increasing steadily which also has an effect on fertility. 
(Mira and Ahn 2002). Decreasing infant and child mortality (Feyrer et al. 2008) and 
access to effective contraception (Goldin and Katz, 2000) also have an effect on 
demographic change. 
 
The following chapters attempt to examine how influential these factors are in terms of 
fertility and demographic change. In addition, fertility enhancing governmental policies 
and non-economic factors are also taken into consideration in the research. 
 
 
2.1.1.1 Demand for human capital 
 
Together with demographic change (decreased fertility), technological change has 
increased the demand for higher human capital within the labour force. Employees are 
constantly trained and at least in theory government investment into human capital 
development per person has increased. Since the work force growth is slower and the 
investment in training and education is higher per person, the human capital per 
person increases (Lee & Mason 2010). 
 
“Quality” over “quantity” thinking in family planning is highly affected by demand for 
high-human-capital (Galor 2005). In developed countries childhood mortality has 
decreased significantly during the 20th century. This has resulted a way of thinking 
where parents do not have to plan to have more children than is actually desired in 
order to compensate a sudden death of a child (Kabeer 2000).  
 
High fertility within a household leads to lack of time invested into developing human 
capital per household member. On the other hand, higher fertility rate within a 
household also dilutes the human capital per household member due to lack of 
resources to support the development of human capital (Chu et al. 2009). If parents 
can fully invest the planned resources per child, they can potentially increase the 
human capital and meet the demand of society and the labour market. According to 
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Galor (2005) the increasing demand for high human capital has higher influence on 
demographic change than pure child mortality or economic effects. 
2.1.1.2 Rising income and opportunity cost 
 
Opportunity cost arises when a decision to use excess resources arise. The opportunity 
cost is the value of the next best alternative option of multiple choices of equal cost 
(McLaughlin & Taggart 1992). With regards to fertility rate per household, the parents 
decide how to allocate the available resources, hence wage income, between own 
consumption and investing in children. To maximize the efficacy of spent income on 
consumption and human capital the household needs to decide the optimal number of 
children (Kabeer 2000). 
 
Despite the fact that income inequality is increasing in the world, the general income 
level has risen significantly over the last 30 years (Inequality Watch 2014). Purchasing 
power is still rather weak in some western countries due to wage levels and high 
taxation (Martikainen 2012) yet the real income level is significantly higher than for 
example in the 1980s (Tilastokeskus 2010; Figure 2). A comfortable life has become 
important in the developed countries (Macunovich 2007) and often this is a quality 
factor that households do not want to compromise (Promislo 2013). According to 
Promislo (2013) some people are willing to compromise even their social relationships 
for work. If having children is seen more as a burden than a quality additive, family 
planning might be postponed to the future or terminated completely. 
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Figure 2. Real income development of Finland vs. World 1980-2013. Purchasing power has 
increased significantly since 1980. World Bank 2014b. 
 
 
2.1.1.2.1 Fertility during recession 
 
It has been shown in several studies that income generation and fertility are linked to 
each other (Micevska 2002). When income level decreases at the national level due to 
recession, the government cannot strongly support parenthood and human capital 
development with incentives such as child care. When the income level declines at 
household level the prospective parents cannot invest the desired amount of resources 
in children (Chu et al. 2009). Most families decide to postpone family planning for a 
more prosperous time period.  
 
By postponing family planning the household takes the risk of not achieving the 
desired number of children. Women especially suffer from this scenario, since the 
child-bearing age is limited for females (Niemeläinen 2013). 
 
There have been cases where recession has boosted total fertility (Niemeläinen 2013). 
However, the argumentation for it has been that the government incentives, such as 
child care and financial support, has not declined per household and therefore the 
economic situation of a household has not lessened due to recession. In other words, 
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having children has been affordable. We can assume that if due to recession the 
government incentives are cut down, the total fertility rate decreases. 
 
 
2.1.1.2.2 Poverty 
 
When birth rates are high in a developed, high-income nation, we often associate the 
high fertility with poverty. The difference to developing nations, however, is that the 
developing countries often have relatively high childhood mortality rates which are 
compensated with bearing more children. This is not the case in developed countries 
(Ritamies 2006). 
 
It is true that often rural parts of a country have higher birth rates compared to those 
of urbanized areas. However, it is not poverty increasing fertility rates, but the 
different lifestyle of rural areas. The lower the mobility of society is the higher is the 
fertility rate due to the “lack of options” in life. Since the fulfilment of urban lifestyle is 
not present in rural areas, the gap is often filled with establishing family (Coontz 
1998). 
 
 
2.1.1.3 Female participation in labour market 
 
Female participation in labour market is often seen as a cause for lower fertility. The 
assumption is that the higher the percentage of females working, the lower is the 
fertility rate. There is also a counter argument stating, that since fertility rate 
decreased women were able to participate in labour force (Macunovich 2007). To 
support the first hypothesis, an existing research conducted by Feyrer et al. (2008, p. 
10) concludes that “a ten-percentage-point increase in female labour force 
participation is associated with 0.45 fewer children per women”.  
 
However, recent studies show that by 2000s the developed countries with higher 
female participation rates have experienced a slight increase in the birth rates 
(Macunovich 2007). The change can be explained by the following two hypothesizes: 
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1) Attitudes towards women as labour force participants and child caregivers have 
changed therefore affecting the fertility rates. When women are accepted in the 
labour force as equal to men, therefore social norms drive the fertility (Bbaale 
2011; Easterlin 1975).  
2) Developed countries can offer better incentives for families having children, i.e. 
day care services (Milligan 2002). 
 
Bloom et al. (2010) argues that when countries adopt new social norms and 
behaviours, fertility will increase as a result of an efficient combination of motherhood 
and female participation in the labour force. 
 
 
2.1.1.4 Infant and child mortality 
 
As stated before, in developing countries the fertility replacement rate is higher than in 
developed countries (2.1) due to higher infant and child mortality (Feyrer et al. 2008; 
Espenshade et al. 2003). According to Casterline (2001) the explanation for the surge 
in population is that initially mortality rates decline and then stimulate a decline in 
fertility rates. In developed countries the child mortality is relatively low, hence 
resulting in lower birth rates (CIA World Fact Book, 2014a & 2014b). If the child 
mortality would increase in developed countries, we could assume an increase in the 
birth rate as well. 
 
 
2.1.1.5 Contraception 
 
The importance of family planning, in other words usage of contraceptives, has been 
argued to have a great effect on fertility rates (Casterline & Feyisetan 2000). Inevitably 
the easy access to birth control has affected family planning; however, it can be 
argued that other factors are more important with regards to total fertility (Koehler 
2012). Contraception should be treated rather as a non-economic, than as economic, 
factor due to its culture and value based relation.  
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2.1.2.6 Non-economic factors 
 
Many of the non-economic factors are listed under “changing values” (Retherford, 
Ogawa & Sakamoto 1996). These factors can for example be increasing individualism, 
religious values, importance of marriage, importance of materialism in a consumer 
society (which can be argued to be also an economic factor), improved family planning 
and birth control, and the wish for “quality” over “quantity” in children (Fernández & 
Fogli 2009, Macunovich 2007). 
 
Many of the factors discussed in the following chapters often change according to 
economic condition and typically a baby boom is explained by economic fluctuation 
within longer term trend. Although there are non-economic factors influencing fertility, 
children are still considered as an “investment” in which the parents are investing their 
scarce resources hoping for future returns i.e. in terms of high human capital or as 
care giving when parents are older (Kabeer 2000).  
 
Culture and values drive the society as a whole (Nayeem 2012) and they largely 
influence daily and long-term decisions (Smith et al. 2002). There are many cultural 
and value-based factors influencing the decision on having children, and more 
importantly the number of children (Fernández & Fogli 2009). For example, often 
people are influenced by their social network, i.e. parents and friends, on the ideal 
quantity of children. In this chapter we will shortly discuss the most important factors 
considered as affecting fertility. 
 
 
2.1.2.6.1. Marriage  
 
In western societies marriage has lost some of its societal and religious value, and is 
considered as an individual choice. Marriage is a legal institution between two parties. 
In most of the western countries it is acceptable to have children outside of marriage. 
Marriage is often entered to secure the family in case something sudden, i.e. death 
happens. Unlike 100 years ago, marriage is not as desirable or regarded as sacred. 
Especially for young women marriage is not anymore the only purpose of life and only 
achievement worth reaching for (Crabtree 2004). 
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Value of independence has increased significantly since the beginning of 1900s (Bordin 
& Anderson 1993; Stevens 2008). Dependency on another person financially is seen as 
a weakness and undesirable situation in life. Postponing marriage, hence establishing 
family, to later age is a common procedure since marriage is not sought to establish 
financial stability (Goudreau 2010). Individuals also study their environment and social 
connections in order to establish a common view on marriage and family (Becker 1981) 
 
It is also fairly common in western countries that either one of the parents stay at 
home to take care of the children. If staying home with children is seen as 
compromising individual freedom, there is a tendency for postponing establishing 
family due to time for self-actualization (Mills et al. 2011). Individualism does not 
directly affect the desired number of children. However, if individualism encourages 
postponing child bearing until late age, it also poses a risk of not reaching the desired 
number of children due to personal fertility (Hirshfeld-Cytron 2013; Hammarberg & 
Clarke 2005). 
 
 
2.1.2.6.2 Gender equality 
 
Gender equality has brought many opportunities to women educationally and work 
wise. As discussed before, female participation in the labour force decreases total 
fertility (Macunovich 2007). However, if gender equality is taken from work and 
education to households as well, we can see a modest increase in the birth rates. The 
male participation in household production is relatively high in Scandinavian countries 
and in the Netherlands. Despite the fact that the female participation in labour force is 
relatively high, the birth rates are in slight increase (Feyrer et al. 2008) 
 
In high-income countries where the child care burden falls mostly on the mother, the 
fertility rate is relatively low. These countries include for example Germany and Spain 
(Kreyenfeld & Karsten 2000; Hank & Kreyenfeld 2009; Borra & Palma 2009). In 
addition to high male participation in household production the fertility rate is positively 
affected by the amount of government subsidies directed to families to assist them and 
encourage fertility (Feyrer et al. 2008). 
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2.1.2.6.2 Governmental policies 
 
Maternity leave is an employee benefit, paid time-off, from work due to having a 
child (KELA 2014b). The length of maternity leave varies from country to country 
(Figure 3) USA being the only OECD country with no guaranteed paid maternity leave. 
According to a research conducted by Feyrer et al. (2008, p. 14), paid extra weeks of 
maternity or paternity leave has an insignificant positive effect on the fertility rate. 
Averett (2001) states that access to paid maternity leave could potentially increase 
fertility; however, in countries where paid maternity leave is already a benefit, a more 
important factor for total fertility seemed to be the existence of a female-friendly 
labour market and the ability to establish a family while working. 
 
Government spending on families with children has a more significant impact on 
fertility. Especially access to child care reduces the opportunity cost of having children 
due to the risk of falling out of the labour market (Adserà 2006; Averett 2001; Feyrer 
et al. 2008). It is a growing trend in Europe due to the demand for empowering work 
conditions for women, that the governments are setting up enhancing policies to meet 
the demand (Becker 1981). It is extremely important to gradually build these policies, 
since they have been proven to have a positive effect on fertility in the OCED countries 
(Averett 2001; Feyrer et al. 2008). 
 
Feyrer et al. (2008) argues that gender equality contributes to a positive fertility rate. 
If we want to investigate even deeper into the topic, it is in fact the contribution of the 
male partner into childcare. The closer the division is to equal, the higher the fertility 
rate of that household, and by extension country, is. The question of equality is 
naturally a cultural question (Schalkwyk 2000); however, culture can change through 
learning. For example in Scandinavian countries the current female employment rate is 
high (World Bank 2013b), which means that families have found alternatives for 
traditional child care (mothers staying home with children) i.e. equal contribution 
between partners or usage of day care services (Haas 2003). 
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Figure 3. Paid and unpaid maternity leave in OECD countries 2013. Glynn & Farrel 2013. 
 
Financial situation is clearly a big contributor to a household’s fertility at individual 
and national level. The financial support from government is seen as positive influence 
to fertility, however, there are always arguments against it: whether it is the tax 
payers’ responsibility to “fund families”, or if the child support has a real effect on 
fertility (Ebenstein et al. 2011). A country needs new taxpayers, however (Clarke & 
Strauss 1998), and therefore we can argue that it is in everyone’s interest that 
regeneration happens. An example from France (Moore, 2006) shows that government 
incentives can be very successful in increasing fertility rates. In 20 years the child 
support grew 70% from $1,793 per child in 1980 to $3,056 in 2000. Together with a 
social multiplier effect (Maurin & Moschion, 2006) the increase resulted in a fertility 
rate growth from 1.85 to 2.03 (World Bank 2014a). Social multiplier happens where 
individual decision making is indirectly affected by the implemented policy through 
social influence by peer groups (Glaeser et al. 2002, p. 1). In other words, individuals 
who have not directly adapted a certain policy might still make the desired decision, 
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however, indirectly influenced by social groups that have already adapted the 
implemented policy. 
 
 
2.1.2.6.1.4 Materialism & life satisfaction 
 
The influence of materialism in relation to family set up has not been researched on a 
larger scale and its influence on the decision of having children should be carefully 
considered (Promislo 2010) However, the concept of materialism has been studied in 
relation to marriage and life satisfaction, both of which can be linked to having a family 
(Li et al. 2011). 
 
Firstly, people who are satisfied with their lives are more likely to get married, and stay 
married, in addition to being more optimistic regarding future life events, such as 
having children (Lucas and Clark, 2006; Lench 2009). Secondly, according to Richins 
and Dawson (1992) there is a lower life satisfaction amongst materialists. In addition 
to many psychological and social problems (Zhou & Gao 2008 cit. Li et al. 2011) also 
general dissatisfaction with life is considered to cause a materialistic coping response 
(Li et al. 2011). 
 
Even though a verified relation between voluntarily childless individuals and 
dissatisfaction with life does not exist (Burman & de Anda 1985; Veenhoven 1974), 
Callan (1986) found in his research that voluntarily childless couples were more 
pessimistic towards life. According to Lerner and Keltner (2001) parents that are 
dissatisfied with their lives also wanted to have fewer children due to different 
uncertainties, including economic. 
 
 
2.1.2.7 Conclusions 
 
As seen above, many different factors influence the decision of a household on having 
children. At some level, all the different factors are related to opportunity cost and on a 
theoretical basis it seems that the cost of losing economic and non-economic freedom 
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is higher than the gain from having children. Individuals also study their surroundings 
therefore giving a lot of influence for culture and social connections. 
 
In developed countries, where a high percentage of females are participating in the 
labour force, the female-friendliness of the work environment and the labour market is 
crucial for birth rates to rise or remain at regeneration level. Gender equality also 
seems to play a big role, especially in terms of child care participation. 
 
Culture and values have influence that can only be controlled to an extent; however, 
different government incentives such as financial support and access to child care have 
an influence on fertility rates. In general, the lower the opportunity cost for having 
children, the higher the fertility is. It seems very important that work-life is not 
excluding the possibility to have a family, and vice versa.  
 
 
2.2 Population growth vs. Economic growth 
 
Population growth is seen as a contributor to economic growth in high-income 
countries. Consumption by children, retirees and human capital investment is paid from 
the contribution of the labour force and companies together with state investment. The 
state income is allocated between consumption and human capital investment (Lee & 
Mason 2010). It can therefore be presumed that population growth would increase the 
number of people participating in the labour force; hence, more transferred 
contribution to state income to fund state spending. 
 
Until the mid-1990s a view known as “population neutralism” was widely believed to be 
true (Frejka et al. 2008; Bloom & Freeman 1986 cit. in Flemingham et al. 2003). The 
view stated that there is no significant correlation between population growth and 
positive economic development. It is true that countries with high population growth 
have a wide variety of different stages of economic growth.  
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2.2.1 Quantity-quality trade off 
 
Adamanti et al (2012) investigated into the original theory of quantity-quality trade off 
model of fertility choice conducted by Becker and Lewis (1973). There are two 
significant and rather obvious results of the study. Firstly, if a large part of the 
population is contributing to the labour force, hence is in working age, the economic 
output per capita increases. In theory, when the population is growing, the population 
in working age is growing as well, therefore outnumbering the children and retirees of 
which living costs are paid from the contributions of the labour force. 
 
The second finding concerns the savings of the labour force. The savings tend to be 
more significant in terms of numbers compared to the non-working population. A 
higher number of working age people accumulates more savings which can be 
channelled to investments. Investments are crucial for economic growth (Jorgenson 
1967).  
 
According to Bloom et al. (2007) there are also other factors contributing to economic 
growth. Firstly, when the life expectancy is longer, workers tend to have a higher 
interest in higher savings in order to support themselves at later age. Secondly, a 
smaller number of children tend to increase the government investment in education 
per child. Higher private and public spending result in better education, therefore 
leading to more productive workers. Thirdly, in parallel with better education, the 
private and public spending can support better a smaller number of children, hence 
leading into better adulthood health. Better health can again lead to more effective 
learning and work input. Last but not least, small family sizes enable women’s higher 
participation in labour force. 
 
There are limitations to the quantity-quality trade off model. The model does not take 
into consideration physical capital, thus income being equal to the wage. The 
consumption of children, retirees and investments to human capital are all funded via 
transfers from workers only. It also assumes that all children have equal opportunities 
in terms of accessing education, which is not always the case (Lee & Mason 2010). 
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Despite some limitations the model has, we can still use the model as a basic theory to 
understand how fertility and economic growth are interlinked.  
 
 
2.2.2 Migration as a means of population growth 
 
As discussed in earlier chapters, fertility is seen as an important factor for economic 
stability and growth of a country. It can be said that in the long term fertility rates 
below regeneration level will affect the economic structure of a country heavily. 
According to Frejka et al. (2008) low fertility is not necessarily as catastrophic as it is 
seen sometimes. Immigration tends to contribute to the population and age structure 
of a country. For example in Europe the birth rates are higher amongst immigrated 
women due to cultural factors. 
 
However, even though immigration contributes to the total fertility of a nation, the 
fraction of immigrated women tend to be so small, that the contribution remains rather 
small. Despite the fact that immigration policies can be challenging to implement and 
are highly controversial, for a country where the working age population is declining 
heavily versus retirees, immigration could be introduced as a solution to avoid 
economic slowdown. Lutz et al. (2006) even suggest that from an environmental 
perspective a declining fertility rate is a positive phenomenon to overcome the distress 
caused by a growing population.  
 
 
2.2.3 Welfare impact on population growth 
 
In high-income countries governments tend to support fertility with different types of 
incentives such as financial child support. Feyrer et al. (2008) argues that in most 
modern societies it is costly to raise children and the current level of the incentives is 
not sufficient to increase fertility on a larger scale. The study reveals that when 
choosing the number of children, most individuals are influenced by their social 
network, i.e. parents and friends, rather that the state incentives. 
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Kohler et al. (2006) states that the economic situation is one reason for postponing 
child bearing due to the uncertain financial situation within a household. If the financial 
situation is secured when having a child, it is more likely that there will be higher 
fertility, since it is not necessary to postpone childbearing in hope of a better economic 
situation (Rotkirch 2012). However, this is not the case in all high-income welfare 
countries. For example, Goldstein et al. (2003) argues that persistently low fertility 
rates, for example in Germany and Austria, are due to shifting fertility ideals. This 
setting can also be maintained due to insufficient support for families with children, or 
inability to obtain part-time work, or re-entry the labour market after child bearing. 
 
In countries where there are relatively many children and high female participation in 
the labour force, there is also a tendency to create a more family friendly infrastructure 
even in the labour market (Feyrer et al. 2008). It is difficult to boost fertility, which is 
very much affected by individuals’ values, with state incentives. However, Lutz et al. 
(2003) state that the most effective policies are the ones affecting late childbearing. As 
we have discussed in previous chapters, opportunity cost of having family over work 
has a high influence on the decision of postponing fertility until a later age. Hoem 
(2008 p. 256, cited in Feyrer et al. 2008) supports the hypothesis by saying that public 
policies can affect fertility positively, although only if they are “embedded in a family-
friendly culture deliberately nurtured by the state”. 
 
 
2.1.3.1 Population growth and age structure Europe 
 
During the past 50 years, the fertility rates have declined drastically across Europe. To 
paint the picture more dramatically, all European countries have birth rates that are 
below the replacement level of 2.1. The declining fertility rate is a long-term trend in 
Europe and even migration has not been able to fix the problem due to the existing 
age structure (Bloom & Sousa-poza, 2010). In Figure 4 we can examine the current 
and future situation within Europe in terms of age structure. As we can see, the age 
structure will continue to be imbalanced, if the forecast will prove to be correct. 
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Figure 4. Age structure in Europe. Solid color resembles the year 2060. The bordered color 
resembles the current situation, the year 2011. Eurostat 2011. 
 
Bloom & Sousa-poza (2010) argue that the current situation of a declining and ageing 
population will result in decreasing economic growth and lower standards of living in 
the long run. For example, often rising costs of health care are associated with an 
ageing population (Dittrich & Stara, 2013). The reasoning is that there is not enough 
labour force to cover the cost of the less productive age groups, children and elderly, 
in terms of taxation. However, Bloom et al. (2009, cit in Dittrich & Stara 2013) argues 
that the share of workers would in fact rise due to the combination of declining fertility 
and higher female participation in work life. Almost certainly some countries will face 
labour shortages due to the fact that female participation in labour is already high. An 
interesting question is how these countries will manage the shortage, if an increase in 
immigration is not politically feasible.  
 
 
2.2.4 Conclusions 
 
From the discussion conducted in this chapter, we can conclude that population growth 
and economic growth are interlinked. We can also see that culture and values have 
high impact on economic growth through fertility. Since culture and values are difficult 
to change short term, only governmental policies can be influenced in order to boost 
fertility short term. 
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Age structure is a long term challenge in most of the high-income countries. Post war 
baby boom created an age class that is currently retiring. The fraction of working 
population is not high enough in most countries to transfer the necessary funds to 
cover the costs generated by the elderly without significantly altering consumption 
patterns and living standards of the working population. In countries where the 
fraction of working population is getting significantly smaller compared to those who 
are not as productive, a potential short term solution to fill the shortfall is by increasing 
immigration. However, immigration is a very controversial topic and politically 
challenging to implement. 
 
In high-income countries it is unlikely that high fertility rates will ever be reached. 
However, there could be potentially an increase up to the level of regeneration of 2.1. 
Since values can hardly be changed in the short term, avoiding postponement of child 
bearing is crucial. It is highly important that the labour market is family-friendly and re-
entry to work life after having children is unproblematic. 
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3 Investigation into reasons and consequences of the fertility rate in 
Finland 
 
Since the decade of baby booming in the 1940s birth rates have been in decline in 
Finland (Figure 5). The year 1969 has been the last year in our history, when the birth 
rate has been on a level of regeneration. According to Väestöliitto (2013) 60 000 
babies are born annually in Finland and the rate of total fertility is 1.76 (CIA World Fact 
Book 2013). The level is higher than in most of the Europe (Appendix 1); however, it is 
below the regeneration level of 2.1. All high-income countries seem to have a birth 
rate below 2.0, although there are two exceptions. USA has a fertility rate of 2.6 and 
France 2.8, which raises interesting questions regarding the policies and cultural 
factors influencing the birth rate. 
 
 
Figure 5. Total fertility rate per woman in Finland. Tilastokeskus 2007b. 
 
We can argue that in the beginning of the 1900s the fertility rate was still high due to 
relatively high infant and child mortality rates (Korpi 2010 & Alanen 1994). Children 
were also treated in a different way compared to the situation today: in an agriculture-
driven economy an extra pair of hands enabled more work to be done (Korhonen 
1999).  
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What caused the change in the trend of large family size? We can see in Figure 5 that 
in the post war years, after WWI and WWII, the fertility rate has a high peak. 
According to Maoz et al. (2008) the post war fertility peak was a result of gender 
inequality and few job opportunities offered to women. In this situation the natural 
choice is to stay home and establish a family. Easterlin’s hypothesis attempts to explain 
the peak with relative income theory, where in an ideal world couples marry young, 
have children and can match the current living standards all at the same time (Shapiro 
1997). The post war world would have been therefore very close to this ideal world. 
According to Jutikkala (1987) the fertility peak was expected, however, the fertility 
rose unexpectedly high. Ritamies (2006) sates that many factors contributed to post 
war baby boom, and the most influential of them being the fact that most people 
postponed child bearing until after the war and the significant decrease in infant 
mortality (Tilastokeskus 2010). Some argue that the fertility rose due to high devotion 
towards the country to produce more children to compensate the lost ones during the 
war (Haimi 2004). However, extensive research does not exist to prove that Finns were 
so patriotic and devoted to their country despite the existence of fertility propaganda.  
 
We can agree that there are many factors contributing to post war fertility. The current 
age structure, and the fertility rate trend in Finland, however, is very worrying. After 
WWII, Finland faced a rapid restructuring and industrialisation and people moved from 
the countryside to urban areas. In 1920, 70% of the Finns lived off of agriculture and 
lived in the countryside. Today, only 90 year later, 70% of the population lives in urban 
areas receiving their income from different state paid and service based activities. Only 
approximately 4% receives their income from agriculture (Tilastokeskus 2007a). During 
the reformation of the living structure, family structure changed as well. In early 1900s 
families still had 5-6 children per family; however, living in a city and both parents 
working outside the home raised challenges in family planning (Tilastokeskus 2010 & 
Alanen 1994). 
 
The current trend is leading to ageing of the population. The post war baby boomers 
are retiring, and the bill is to be paid by the younger generation. Compared to the 
working population the number of retirees is significantly high, approximately on a 
ratio of 1:3 (Tilastokeskus 2014b). 
      24 
 
 
3.1 Economic circumstances and recession 
 
As we have seen earlier, an economic recession affects fertility negatively (Talous 
Sanomat 2011). Families postpone childbearing, especially of the first child. However, 
families might have their 2nd and 3rd child sooner (Kokko 2010). During the recession in 
the early 1990s Finland faced a minor baby boom (Niemeläinen 2013). When the 
economic downturn of 2008 hit Finland many expected the fertility rate to rise (Kokko 
2010). According to Väestöliitto statistics (2013 cit. in Niemeläinen 2013) the fertility 
was 1.8, or slightly above, during 2004- 2014 and no significant change in either 
direction was seen. However, a very recent article published by Väestöliitto (Miettinen 
& Lainiala 2014) shows that fertility has been declining since 2011 due to prolonged 
economic downturn (Figure 6, Perttu 2013). 
 
 
Figure 6. A graph published by Väestöliitto. Number of born children per year has declined 
three years in a row. YLE 2014b. 
 
If recession should affect fertility negatively, why did the fertility rise during the 1990s 
recession? Niemeläinen (2013) and Talous Sanomat (2011) both agree that fertility 
rose due to good benefits allocated to families with children. For example, if the 
mother decided to stay home to take care of the child instead of using day care 
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services, the financial support was relatively high. In addition, it was possible to enjoy 
both unemployment benefit and home care allowance at the same time, therefore 
enabling some financial stability during recession. Today, the amount of home care 
allowance received is deducted from the possible unemployment benefit, hence 
decreasing the financial benefit received (KELA 2014a). 
 
Let us assume that only families with no children postponed childbearing during the 
1990s recession, and families with 1 or 2 children would have made the decision to 
have their 2nd and 3rd child. We could therefore assume that the pattern would be the 
same during the economic downturn of 2008, only families hesitating more over having 
2nd and 3rd child. In the 1990s the median age of a primiparous was 26.8 and 28.3 in 
2010. Since the age of primiparous has increased, we can assume that there are more 
childless women who postpone childbearing due to economic reasons than compared 
to the 1990s (see Figure 7). Especially women with higher education were more likely 
to postpone childbearing (Ritamies 2006). 
 
 
Figure 7. Figure gives a simple comparison of women with and without children during 1990s 
recession and the economic downturn of 2008.  
 
 
3.1.1 Economy of a single household 
 
Families tend to set the number of desired children based on what is suitable for their 
specific life and financial situation (Ritamies 2006). Often the financial situation of a 
family is challenging due to high living costs in Finland (EURES 2014). The VAT of food 
and clothing is high at EU level and the cost of individual car use does not come cheap 
either. All of these areas are consumables that families with children consumes the 
most. 
 
The income inequality between families with children and the high-income class has 
widened over the years, therefore creating a tough environment for families to survive 
2010 Women with no children Women with at least one child
1990 Women with no children Women with at least one child
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44
Age
Ye
ar
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in. In addition, the housing expenses have increased, which often affects the young 
families the most. There are government policies the relieve some of the financial 
burden families face. However, often these incentives and benefits are included in 
state budget cuts, therefore the incentives are lagging behind the general price level 
(Bardy, Salmi & Heino 2001). 
 
The financial subsidies will be discussed at later stage. For now the concentration will 
be on the child support and other direct financial benefits. 
 
 
3.2 Governmental policies enabling fertility 
 
Finland offers quite extensive benefits to families with children. To mention a few of 
the numerous benefits: paid leave to take care of the child, offered to both parents; 
financial support; access to child care; and affordable housing system. In this chapter 
we will concentrate on the most concrete ones: maternity leave, financial support and 
child care. 
 
 
3.2.1 Maternity and paternity leave 
 
Finnish women are entitled to have a four month paid maternity leave and six months 
of parental leave (vanhenpainvapaa). The whole period is commonly called maternity 
leave and it lasts until the child is 9 months old. If the mother is working prior to 
getting pregnant the usually the employer is required to pay maximum 90% of the 
salary for the first 56 days, after which the state will pay maximum 70% of the salary 
for the rest of the time, which is minimum €23.92 per day excluding Sundays and 
holidays (KELA 2014b). 
 
Father is entitled to have 54 days unpaid leave (unpaid by the employer), however, the 
state will pay 70% of the salary. The father is also allowed to share the parental leave 
with the mother (KELA 2014b). After the parental leave, both parents are allowed to 
stay home to until the child is three years old, and the stay-at-home parent is entitled 
to receive a home care subsidy from the state (kotihoidontuki). 
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Compared to many other countries, Finland offers extensive benefits enabling efficient 
child care after the baby is born, which is meant to boost fertility. For example, USA 
does not offer paid maternity leave at all (The Guardian 2013). According to Feyrer et 
al. (2008, p. 14), lengthening the paid maternity or paternity leave will not result in a 
significant increase in fertility rates. A parental leave from Iceland is different from the 
traditional parental leave, where the mother stays home for a longer period of time 
and the father is entitled to have shorter leave if wanted. In Iceland both parents are 
entitled to have a three month-period of maternity and paternity leave, which is non-
tradable. In addition parents can take another three-month-period of paid leave, which 
can be divided if wanted (Government of Iceland 2014). The combination of parental 
leaves is not lengthy compared to i.e. Finland. However, the system is not only gender 
equal but it has also had an effect on maintaining the fertility rate above 2.0 (Statistics 
Iceland 2013). 
 
 
3.2.2 Childcare 
 
Every family with children has the right to state provided child care until the child 
enters elementary school at age seven. The child care is not free, however: the 
maximum payment for the oldest child is €264 per month and for the youngest ones 
€238 per month (STM 2014). 
 
The access to child care can be complicated, however. Kindergartens can be far away 
from home or work place which can result in long day care hours. In addition, there 
are no tax incentives available for using own car for transportation, if public 
transportation is available, even if the time used for travelling is significantly less by car 
than by bus, for example (Verohallinto 2014). The city of Kuhmo (2013) offered a 
solution to long distance driving; for separate payment transportation to kindergarten 
could be arranged from an area where there is already existing transportation for 
pupils. 
 
Many parents decide to stay home to take care of their children. However, despite the 
limitations the child care might have, it enables the parents to enter labour market if 
wanted.  
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3.3.3 Financial support 
 
The Finnish government provides financial support to each child until the age 17 
irrespective of the income class of the parents (KELA 2014c). The system is graded so 
that the first child receives €104.19 per month, the second child receives €115.13 per 
month and €189.63 being the maximum that is received by the 5th child and each child 
after that. The financial benefit is lagging behind the salary evolution and the real 
purchasing power falls year by year since the benefit is not tied to any kind of 
consumer index (Talous Sanomat 2010; Bardy et al. 2001). 
 
Child support is meant to cover some of the expenses families have. The graded 
increase is supposed to secure the financial situation of a family with many children. 
Family related tax benefits were relatively largely effective until 1994 after which they 
were relinquished and transferred to financial child support (Bardy et al. 2001). 
 
Financial support has a strong relation to fertility, since it brings security into life where 
expenses suddenly increase. We can assume that the more financial support the family 
receives, the higher is the fertility rate, as the earlier example of France explained. The 
municipality of Lestijärvi shows great example of the hypothesis. The municipality 
offered families 1,000 euros per child per year until the child turns 10 years. In a small 
municipality the fertility rose from one born child in 2012 to 14 children in 2013. Even 
though the fertility cannot fully be explained by the financial incentive, it surely had 
great effect (HS 2013). 
 
 
3.3 Contraception and desired number of children 
 
In Finland, different methods have been used to control the number of children from 
as early as 1910 (Ritamies 2006). The desired number of children, however, was often 
less than the actual number of children since the birth control methods were not 
effective enough and men were in charge of the number of children. The modern birth 
control, mainly contraception pill and condoms, arrived to Finland after WWII. For the 
first time the means for family planning was truly available. In addition women also 
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became more equal in their partnerships, therefore being able to influence the desired 
number of children. 
 
Interestingly, the desired number of children has not decreased as much as we would 
expect from the fertility rate decline between 1900 and 1990 (Figure 5). In the early 
1900s Finns already wanted a relatively small family, but they did not have the tools to 
achieve the desire. Helsingin Sanomat (1954 cit. in Ritamies 2006) conducted a survey 
which showed that in 1947 the desired number of children was 3.1 and 2.9 in 1953. 
According to Visuri (1975 cit. in Ritamies 2006) the upper class desired to have more 
children than the working class. In the 1990s the ideal number of children in a Finnish 
family was seen as 2.5 children (Ritamies 2000, cit. in Ritamies 2006), however, the 
expected number of own children was often a little bit lower than the ideal. 
 
It seems that the ideal number of children has not declined as much as could be 
interpreted from the declined birth rate. As we have previously discussed, 
contraception has affected the fertility rates. However, the number of desired children 
has not changed dramatically; hence, if effective birth control had been available in the 
beginning of 1900s the birth rates would have been lower. Today, birth control enables 
women to have the number of children that they have always wanted to have. 
Contraception, however, does affect the timing of bearing children. When child bearing 
is postponed to later age, achieving the desired number of children becomes more 
difficult and often cannot be met (Ritamies 2006). 
 
 
3.4 Average family size and childless couples 
 
According to Tilastokeskus (2012) the number of families with children is decreasing 
steadily. In the 1990s the number of families with children was 47% (including single 
parents) of total population and in 2011 only 40%. The number of children per family 
has not changed dramatically over the years, however (Figure 8). The number of 
families with two children has increased balancing the decreasing number of families 
with four or more children. 
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Figure 8. Number of children in families with children (Tilastokeskus 2012a). 
 
Yle (2011) released news relating to childless families stating that childlessness is 
decreasing steadily. 21% of 40-year-old women do not have children and they are not 
planning to have any, whereas in 1990 the equivalent number was only 15% 
(Talouselämä 2012). Even the number of childless families (married or domestic 
partnership) is increasing being 35% of all families in 2010 (Vapaaehtoisesti 
Lapsettomat ry 2014). 
 
We can see that the number of families is more influential factor than the number of 
children per family with children in terms of total fertility rate. In order to increase the 
total fertility rate, the family size should increase (families with 2 or more children) or 
the childless parents should be encouraged to have children. In addition, actions are 
needed to prevent the increase in the number of voluntarily or involuntarily childless 
women. 
 
 
3.5 Cultural factors 
 
Pukkila (2005, p.17) talks about the importance of culture as a determinant of fertility. 
The modern culture emphasizes gender equality, individual freedom and self 
actualization. The characteristics of modern culture are a universal educational system, 
success based on own skills (meritocracy) and civil rights. There are also defined 
Year Family total 1 2 3 4+
1950 100 39,2 28,9 15,9 16,1
1960 100 37,4 29,9 16,6 16,2
1970 100 42,5 32,8 14,8 9,9
1980 100 48,5 38,5 10,2 2,9
1990 100 44,7 39,1 12,7 3,5
2000 100 43,8 37,7 13,9 4,6
2005 100 43,2 38,2 13,8 4,8
2008 100 43,4 38,4 13,4 4,8
2009 100 43,6 38,3 13,3 4,9
2010 100 43,7 38,2 13,2 4,9
2011 100 43,8 38,2 13,2 4,9
Number of children %
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measurements of modern culture: female participation in labour market, level of 
education, number of people living in cities and social security. According to Pearce 
Snyder (cited in Pukkila 2005, p. 17) the more these measurements are valued, the 
lower is the fertility of the nation. Ritamies (2006) and Mäkinen (2008) also emphasize 
the importance of cultural change in relation to fertility. 
 
 
3.5.2 Labour market and gender equality 
 
The position of Finnish women in the labour market is strong (PWC 2014). In theory 
the labour market in Finland is gender equal and gender discrimination is illegal 
(Finnish Ministry of Justice 1986). This is not always the case, however, and especially 
young women face gender discrimination. Employers might be afraid of the financial 
consequences that a pregnancy might bring along and therefore choose a candidate 
that is either male or older woman whose children are older (Saarinen 2014). 
 
The worry is understandable from an employer’s point of view. The employer is 
mandated to pay four months’ salary to the mother. Even though the employer can 
claim up to 90% of the salary from the state, there are other costs involved which are 
not refunded. Often the pregnant mother needs days off for doctor visits and sick 
leave, which are fully paid by the employer. In addition, when the employee enters 
maternity leave, the employee needs to find a replacement which is a cost in terms of 
time and training (Nieminen 2014). In addition, the mother is entitled to return to her 
job prior to maternity leave. 
 
The European Union recently made a decision with regards to paid maternity leave. It 
states that if the mother will have a second child while still being on parental leave, the 
employer is entitled to pay three months’ salary according to collective labour 
agreement (Kokko 2014) which sounds unreasonable according to Suomen 
Yrittäjänaiset Ry (Nieminen 2014). True Finns (Perus Suomalaiset) politician Pirkko 
Ruohonen-Lerner commented on the decision that “it is worthwhile to hire young 
males rather than females” (Pohjanpalo 2014), which she later claimed to be irony. 
There is a little bit truth in the comment, however. According to Tarja Filatov (SD) the 
employer costs related to maternity leave can become immoderate depending on the 
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size of the company. She states that the maternity leave of 10 women in a company of 
100 employees is very different financially than in a company of three employees of 
which 2-3 enters maternity leave (HS 2014a). In addition, in general the mother stays 
at home when a young child is sick, which generates costs to the mother’s employer. 
 
Well educated women who are in leadership roles in business world and politics 
somewhat agree on discrimination of mothers. Lipponen (2006) tells a story of 16 
women and how they see the career opportunities laid before them. All of them agreed 
that it is more challenging to advance career wise if women have small children than 
not. A result of a research conducted by Sinikka Vanhala (2005, cited in Lipponen 
2006) gave an idea of the demanding and masculine business world. 45% of the 
women felt guilty not being able to contribute properly to household duties. Only 10% 
did not feel guilty at all. Today’s business world requires 100% commitment and if an 
employee is not able to commit to it for whatever reasons (for women it is often 
family) the career advancement is more challenging or even impossible. 
 
Often women work in employment sectors that are low paid and female driven, such 
as nursing and teaching. These are also sectors that face constant labour shortage 
(Kivioja 2013, Turunen & Leino 2012, Huotari 2012). It is relatively easy to enter the 
labour market after establishing a family; however, the career development 
opportunities may be scarce. In addition, the health care sector does not change 
dramatically even in five years, and it is relatively easy to continue working after being 
on parental leave for longer period of time. The situation can be very different in 
constantly changing, technology driven industries, therefore creating a barrier of entry 
back to the labour market. In theory, the employer has to offer back the job prior to 
maternity leave. If the job conditions have changed dramatically and the employer 
sees a gap in employee’s knowledge, the employer can offer something similar to the 
job prior to maternity leave (Työtuomioistuin 2013), which might not be as satisfying 
to the employee as the previous job position. 
 
The father is also entitled to have paternity leave, as we have discussed earlier. The 
paternity leave is unpaid by the employer and is only for a maximum three months 
long. In case the father is not sharing the parental leave with the mother, there are no 
significant costs involved from the employer’s point of view. In Finland the number of 
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fathers using the whole three month period is still rather small (KELA 2010), which 
decreases the overall cost even more.  
 
Women striving for leadership roles might face difficulties if they become pregnant or 
they have small children at home. Job positions that require 100% commitment and 
flexibility are often filled with employees with insignificant or no family liabilities. A 
woman with a family can be seen as a financial risk, either by having more children or 
staying home when the existing children are sick. Leadership roles are also more 
difficult to replace if required skills are scarce in the labour market. 
 
 
3.5.3 Gender equality in household duties 
 
Scandinavian countries and Finland enjoy high gender equality (Zahidi 2013). For 
example, female participation in the labour force is 56% in Finland (World Bank 2012). 
As more women are working outside of home, it is often seen as unfair that women 
alone would take care of the house and children in addition to their work. Division of 
household duties between two partners is a cultural phenomenon, and the split is more 
equal as the gender equality increases in general (Pukkila 2005 & Ritamies 2006). 
 
As discussed before, an equal split between partners in terms of child care tends to 
increase fertility (Feyrer et al. 2008). In her study into contemporary Russian 
motherhood Anna Temkina (2010 in Finnish Yearbook of Population Research) agrees 
that equality in household duties affects fertility, although only indirectly. She states 
that equality in household duties is more likely to affect the timing of having children, 
rather than the quantity. If women are able to have children at earlier age due to 
partners’ contribution to child care, it is more likely that women are able to achieve the 
desired number of children since it is not needed to postpone childbearing to a later 
age.  
 
An example from Germany is interesting: The country is highly gender equal; however, 
with child care the responsibility falls on the mothers and often work life is difficult to 
combine with the family life (Benhold 2010; Daley & Kulish 2013). Therefore, women 
postpone childbearing until a later age in order to establish their career, and after it 
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might be too late to have children (Carroll 2011). The fertility rate of 1.4 (World Bank 
2013a) in Germany is one of the lowest in Europe. 
 
The more partners are helping in child care, the more equal is the burden on 
employers as well. In a gender equal world this would be ideal, since it would be more 
challenging to discriminate only young women and mothers based on the time spent 
on child care.  
 
 
3.5.4 Marriage 
 
The meaning of marriage has changed a lot in Finland since the early 1900s (Ritamies 
2006). Divorce used to be rare and marriage was there to last for a lifetime despite 
some unfaithfulness that might have occurred. Marriage was a partnership for a family, 
which it is still today. However, having children without getting married (common law 
marriage) is acceptable and ordinary. In addition, divorces are common: every year 
13,000-14,000 marriages are terminated (Figure 9). 
 
 
Figure 9. Number of divorces and total divorce rate in Finland. (Väestöliitto 2014a) 
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Often marriage is seen only as a legal partnership where the partners are entitled to 
the rights and benefits of a marriage. Common law marriage is common especially 
amongst young people (Väestöliitto 2014b), however, often when having children is 
timely couples get married due to legal reasons. Marriage is not seen as a permanent 
decision, although, it is desirable it would last for a lifetime. There is also no significant 
difference in the number of children per family, whether the parents are married or 
not. 
 
 
3.5.5 Religious values 
 
Jutikkala (1987) states that the general fertility decline is a result of a breakthrough of 
rational thinking rather than fading religious morals, as some may argue. It is true, 
that often cultures with high religious values obtain higher fertility rates. We can see 
some evidence of that pattern in Finland as well. The Oulu municipality in the North of 
Finland had a total birth rate of 2.03 in 2013, which has been the highest by far within 
Finland. In comparison, Helsinki as the capital of Finland had a birth rate of only 1.35 
in the same year (Tilastokeskus 2013b). 
 
The exceptionally high birth rate in Oulu is at least partially explained by the relatively 
high number of Conservative Laestadians, a religious sect that is part of the Lutheran 
church. Amongst the Conservative Laestadians it is very uncommon to use 
contraception and it is highly encouraged to have as many children as possible. There 
has not been a recent population study on Laestadionism. However, in the 1980s in 
Oulu municipality there was an example of a town, where 40% of the people belonged 
to Laestadian sect, where the fertility rate was 3.68. The total average in Finland was 
1.68 on the same year (Terämä 2010 in Finnish yearbook of population research). 
 
Despite the effect the religious sects might have on the total fertility, they are still 
considered as very marginal. Most of the Finnish population has obtained a modern 
view of family planning, where it is acceptable to control child bearing, or not have 
children at all (Ritamies 2006). Therefore, in this research we will rather concentrate 
on this part of the population, where clearly the challenge of underproduction of 
children comes from. 
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3.6 Immigration 
 
The number of immigrants in Finland is increasing steadily (The Finnish Immigration 
Service 2014; Figure 10). The population growth in Finland is solely a reason of 
increasing immigration (YLE 2014a). On 21 April 2014 the population of Finland was 
5,458,113 (VRK 2014). According to Tilastokeskus (2012b) without immigration the 
number of children under 15-years-old would be the lowest in 120 years. Even though 
the fraction of immigrants is relatively small of the total population (4.2% in 2010) the 
effect can already be seen in the age structure of population. 
 
Based on the numbers we could assume that by increasing immigration, the age 
structural problem could be solved. Although theoretically immigration seems feasible 
solution, the reality is very different. The country might not have all the resources in 
order to rehabilitate extensive numbers of people entering the country and provide 
same services as the autochthonous population is entitled to. The values and opinions 
of the autochthonous population are also important: Large numbers of immigrants can 
be seen as financial and racial threat and as a financial burden on tax payers (YLE 
2013b). 
 
 
      37 
 
 
Figure 10. Immigration, emigration and net immigration of Finland from 1980 to 2012. 
(Väestöliitto 2014c) 
 
Many European countries have supported their ageing populations with migration; 
however, politically motivated migration policies are very controversial and many 
countries would like to have more control over immigration, especially inside the 
European Union, where the laws of free movement of labour take place (European 
Commission 2014). Switzerland, although not part of the EU, closed its borders to free 
movement of people and challenged immigration policies (Turtiainen 2014). The 
decision is somewhat understandable since the Swiss population with an immigrant 
background was 34.7% in 2012 (Swiss statistics 2012). Immigration policies are 
controversial and difficult to maintain in the long-term. However, immigration can be 
the shortest way to slow-down the economic downturn. 
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4 Discussion 
 
According to the Save the Children report on “Surviving the First Day” (2013) Finland is 
the world’s best place to be a mother, yet Finnish mothers are not having enough 
children. The report reflects mainly the living conditions from a child mortality point of 
view and the accessibility to the mother and new born child of health care. The report 
also touches on gender equality, but only in relation to children’s health: “When 
mothers are strong and stable – physically, financially and socially – their children are 
more likely to survive and thrive” (Save the Children 2013, p. 60).  
 
We often discuss how well families with children are treated: the state offers day care 
services, minor financial and non-financial aid, education and paid parental leaves to 
ensure that the baby gets the needed attention. We assume that as long as the child is 
taken care of the mother is happy and satisfied as well. This is not always the case, 
however. If the mother has to make a choice between her career and a family, instead 
of having both, the opportunity cost of choosing a family might be too high. If a young 
woman is about to enter the labour market the first time, the decision of having 
children now and not gain any work experience over the following years is easily 
overrun by the decision of gaining work experience first and postponing childbearing at 
later age. 
 
We have seen that traditional or religious values rarely guide the decision on having 
children in high-income countries. Family planning is more common than not and birth 
control is available to everyone – and its use is encouraged. Therefore we can assume 
that the most influential factors are social circumstances and individual values. These 
can be freedom socially and financially, ability to work while having a family and the 
contribution of the partner on child care. In general, women want to enter the labour 
market soon after having children (STT 2014), especially those with higher education 
and good employment position. According to the union of Finland’s economists (Sefe 
2012) it is crucial to return to work life relatively fast in order to gather work 
experience and sustain salary evolvement. Jyrki Katainen, the Prime Minister of 
Finland, stated that long time periods away from work will significantly weaken 
women’s position in labour market (Kauhanen 2012). 
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4.1 Childless women and typical family size 
 
The number of childless women in Finland is increasing, as discovered in the research. 
There is an involuntary and voluntary childlessness of which the latter is growing 
steadily. We discovered that the number of children per family has not changed 
drastically since 1950. However, the number of families with children has decreased, 
being only 40% of the total population. It is important to boost the fertility in families 
with only 1-2 children, although the true challenge is the increasing number of 
voluntarily childless women. 
 
Often the opportunity cost of having children is too high when compared to the 
financial and social freedom that childless families have. Many women in leadership 
roles have told that man-like-women succeed in the business world, whereas mothers 
are seen as less competitive. 100% commitment is required for career advancement 
and motherhood can be seen as a limitation, since family overrules career. For a career 
oriented woman this is too big a risk to be taken. It is highly important to enhance 
policies that enable combining career and family. These policies could prevent women 
postponing their childbearing until late age when it is challenging to meet the desired 
number of children. In addition, there could potentially be a positive effect on 
voluntarily childless women, if they do not need to compromise their freedom over the 
family. 
 
 
4.2 Female participation in labour force 
 
We can see that female employment before and after having children is one of the 
most important factors contributing to fertility. We have also seen that companies 
might have negative perspectives towards young childless women, as they are afraid of 
possible pregnancies and the related financial costs. It can also be challenging to enter 
the labour market again after having children. If the mother is the primary care giver 
in the family, upon a child’s sickness the mother will be off from work therefore 
creating a cost to the employer. Maternity and parental leaves are long, and costs for 
employer can become high, especially if the employer is a small company with few 
employees. Financially it is more secure to hire males. 
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According to Lipponen (2006), women need to ”act like men” in order to be fully 
accepted in the work society. A mother can rarely be “a man”. The experience of a 
mother is not often valued: Lipponen describes that a person who attempted to enter 
school in order to study to be a kindergarten teacher did not gain any points in the 
exam of her 10 year childcare experience as a house wife. The explanation was that 
her own children are different from others. It is interesting why 24/7 job as an 
organiser and multitasker is not valued, but military training at officer level is seen as a 
good way to enter leadership position in business world, at least according to Björn 
Wahlroos, who is chairman of the board in many multinational Finnish companies 
(Karttunen 2006). 
 
 
4.3 Financial situation of a household 
 
The traditional view is that women should stay at home and take care of children 
instead of working. Salary inequality between men and women supports this view 
point: Often the mother stays home to take care of the children since the father likely 
has a higher income which is needed to support the family financially. This is not the 
case in the modern world and is less likely to be changing in the future. More likely the 
female participation is rising due to a shortage in the labour market after the baby 
boomers retire (Bloom et al. 2009, cited in Dittrich & Stara 2013). In addition family 
sizes are getting smaller, hence enabling women to enter the labour force after having 
children. 
 
If mothers can work while having children, the financial situation of the family will be 
better than if the mother is staying at home. However, if the income of the family is 
not high, having children may become costly. Therefore it is important that the state 
supports families financially. As we have seen in the research, higher financial 
subsidies support fertility. During an economic downturn, financial stability is crucial. 
Even small changes, not to mention unemployment, may result in postponing 
childbearing. The recent cuts made in the Finnish child support (Sutinen 2014; HS 
2014c), together with different tax increases, will most likely have some impact on 
fertility. For low-income families even the small cut can be significant, such as in terms 
of children’s activities (HS 2014b) or even food. 
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In comparison, Germany decided to increase the child support (Rajamäki 2014) where 
financial aid is available up to the child’s 25th birthday (in Finland only up to 17 years). 
Even though parents’ maintenance liability ends when child turns 18 years, parents 
often support their children through their studies. The German child support prevents 
possible financial burdens arising from the scenario that now applies to Finland.  
 
 
4.4 Parental leave and employment challenges 
 
The more family friendly the labour market is, the higher fertility is since it is easier to 
combine employment and family. As long as fertility is a burden on employers of the 
mothers, the labour market will treat young women unequally. Therefore it is crucial to 
bring the responsibility of parents closer to equal in terms of child care. The 
government prepared a law where parental leave (after maternity leave) is required to 
be split between parents. The payment for parental leave is minimum of €23.92 per 
day (Saturdays are included) and it is progressive according to the parent’s income, 
and who is on parental leave. The maximum payment is €113.82 for earnings of 
€60,000+ per year. Even with the highest grade the payment is approximately €2950 
per month which is €2000 less than the monthly salary. It is clear those individuals 
who are highly dependent on their partners’ higher income will suffer from the 
arrangement.  
 
The model from Iceland is a potential solution. Both the mother and father are 
required to take care of their new born child after birth. Parental leave is divided into 
three sections where both parents take turns in taking care of the child. The first two 
of the three month periods are required to be taken off by both parents. Normally the 
mother takes care of the new born for the first three months, and the father the next 
three months. After six months there is an opportunity to take another three-month 
period off. This period can be used by either parent or split in a desirable way. All 
three periods are paid with 80% of the salary of the parent on parental leave. In case 
it is wanted, the parental leave can be continued without a pay. 
 
The system used in Iceland enables gender equality in child care, but most of all, it 
prevents young women from labour discrimination since both parents are equally a 
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cost to employers. In addition, the system prevents a fall out from labour market, 
which may occur if the employee is too long away from work. This is especially the 
case with highly technological and constantly changing industries. 
 
 
4.5 Cost of living and taxation 
 
Many studies show that the economic situation of a nation and individual household 
affects family planning. Low-income families are the households with the least spare 
income and when the economy is in downturn, families often cut back from extra 
consumption. In addition the uncertainty of employment and constantly increasing 
prices are shadowing purchasing decisions. 
 
Constant VAT increases and other tax implications hit the families with children the 
hardest. Food is a necessity and a family of four certainly consumes more food than a 
family of two or single households. It is true that single person households pay more in 
terms of food and housing per person, since they cannot buy in bulk. However, 
families buy more in quantity due to the number of people in the household, therefore 
increasing the money spent per household. VAT increases for food therefore affect the 
purchasing power of a family more than a single person. 
 
The private ownership of cars has been discussed for a long time, and politicians 
continually try to find ways to reduce driving in cities. The public transportation 
infrastructure in Finnish cities is extensive. However, especially in capital areas the 
distances by public transportation might take a surprisingly long time. If a family has 
small children that are in day care, it is almost necessary to have a private car, in cases 
where the day care location is not within walking distance. This has not been taken 
into account in taxation or gasoline prices and driving has therefore become an 
expensive necessity. Long distances are an even more influential cost outside of cities 
where distances are long and public transportation is not necessarily available at all. 
 
In 1994 the Finnish Government transferred all the current tax incentives allocated to 
families into financial child support. Since then the child support has been lagging 
behind the general salary development. Since financial support is crucial to families, 
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especially those with low income, the tax incentives might be more effective than 
direct financial support. For example, Germany allows couples to claim joint income 
taxation, where both partners’ income is calculated together and then divided into two 
(Constitutional Court of Germany 2014). 
 
This has been the case in Finland in the past as well, but the Government moved to 
individual taxation, since it was seen that the household tax discriminated the party 
who earned less. The split taxation could be voluntary for families, and it could guide 
the family through the time when children are small. A short calculation demonstrates 
the effect of the split taxation: The working parent earns €50,000 per year and the 
partner staying at home earns nothing. The tax percentage of the working partner is 
32.5% and therefore the person pays €13,250 in tax annually. If split taxation is used, 
the income for both parents is then €25,000 per year and the tax percentage 15.0%. 
Both parents would therefore pay annual tax of €3,750, hence €7,500 combined which 
is €6,000 less than tax paid at individual tax rate. Cleary €6,000 contributes to the 
purchasing power of the family in question. 
 
 
4.6 Can immigration fix the current age structure? 
 
Why do we need to boost fertility to exceed the required 2.1 regeneration level? Are 
there other ways to overcome the shortage of working age population and therefore 
provide all the necessary services to less productive fractions of the population, hence, 
children and retirees? With migration policies the country can potentially increase the 
number of those in the working class. For example, Germany is facing drastic fertility 
decline and migration policies are used to boost the number of people in the working 
population (Deutsche Welle 2014). However, the recent example from Switzerland 
shows that there is only a limited number of immigrants the autochthonous population 
will endure. Therefore immigration alone cannot be a solution to ageing population 
 
4.7 Limitations of the research 
 
The main limitation of the study is the lack of qualitative data on the values and 
attitudes of Finnish families. The research was solely conducted based on existing 
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literature and there are surprisingly few extensive studies available on the fertility rates 
in Finland. The area of fertility is also very broad and it is unfeasible to include all the 
relevant aspects and influences in a study such as this. A proper amount of qualitative 
data could have deepened the knowledge on the underlying reasons of low fertility, 
especially of voluntarily childless women.  
 
In the research we discovered that culture and values have a big role in fertility. 
Therefore comparison between different nations and their governmental policies can 
be misleading because of the cultural differences. In further research it is important to 
make a proper comparison between countries with similar culture and values, and how 
policies from different culture base could fit into another specific culture. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Fertility rates in Europe and North America. Source: CIA World Fact Book 2013. 
 
Rank EU, NA World Rank Country 
Children born per 
woman in 2013 
1 90 Kazakhstan  2.38 
2 110 Turkey  2.10 
3 116 Greenland  2.08 
4 117 France  2.08 
5 121 United States  2.06 
6 128 Ireland 2.01 
7 133 French Polynesia  1.97 
8 136 Gibraltar 1.93 
9 137 Azerbaijan 1.92 
10 140 United Kingdom 1.90 
11 142 Iceland 1.88 
12 154 Netherlands  1.78 
13 159 Norway  1.77 
14 161 Luxembourg  1.77 
15 162 Australia  1.77 
16 166 Finland  1.73 
17 167 Denmark  1.73 
18 171 Liechtenstein  1.69 
19 174 Jersey 1.66 
20 173 Sweden  1.67 
21 176 Belgium  1.65 
22 178 Russia  1.61 
23 179 Macedonia  1.59 
24 180 Canada  1.59 
25 182 
Saint Pierre and 
Miquelon  1.55 
26 183 Moldova  1.55 
27 186 Malta  1.53 
28 187 Switzerland  1.53 
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29 188 Monaco  1.51 
30 189 Portugal 1.51 
31 190 Albania  1.49 
32 191 Spain  1.48 
33 192 San Marino  1.48 
34 193 Belarus 1.46 
35 194 Georgia  1.46 
36 195 Cyprus  1.46 
37 197 Croatia  1.45 
38 198 Estonia  1.45 
39 199 Bulgaria  1.43 
40 200 Germany  1.42 
41 201 Austria  1.42 
42 202 Serbia  1.41 
43 203 Italy 1.41 
44 204 Hungary  1.41 
45 205 Greece  1.40 
46 206 Armenia  1.39 
47 207 Slovakia  1.39 
48 209 Andorra  1.37 
49 210 Latvia  1.34 
50 211 Slovenia  1.32 
51 212 Poland  1.32 
52 213 Romania  1.31 
53 214 Czech Republic  1.29 
54 215 Ukraine  1.29 
55 216 Montserrat  1.28 
56 217 Lithuania  1.28 
57 218 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  1.25 
58 220 
British Virgin 
Islands  1.24 
 
 
  
 
